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An Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in
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Abstract
Intense violence in the Middle East continues to force millions of displaced people to
immigrate to Europe. Governments tighten border controls to stem the influx, and
desperate individuals fall victim to human traffickers. Though European Union members
have made progress in developing a legal framework for combatting this evil, past
attempts to coordinate national laws failed to address the growing need. Research is
needed to understand the causes of success and failure in this endeavor. Through a
comparative case study of three states from different parts of Europe- Germany, Hungary
and Turkey- I examine the extent to which to adoption of the European Union’s Council
Framework Decision on Combating Human Trafficking in Human Beings of July 2002 is
associated with change in law and in fact. In particular, I focus on the effect of each
state’s European Union membership status. The findings of this research not only aid
scholars in understanding the capacity for legal change to address the crisis of human
trafficking, but help policymakers in identifying political environments that foster better
compliance with interstate human trafficking measures.
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Introduction
The global community has recognized that human trafficking is a serious
problem. States have responded with international and regional efforts at legal change.
For example, the European Union adopted a Framework Decision on Combatting
Trafficking in Human Beings in 2002, and amended it in 2011. European states’
commitment to this effort has been tested, however, by the influx of migrants stemming
from violence in the Middle East. In this paper, I argue that European Union membership
status (member of the European Union, nonmember of the European Union, candidate for
the European Union) and length of membership will impact states compliance with antitrafficking legislation in the face of the refugee crisis. In particular, nations that are longtime members of the European Union will decrease efforts to comply with anti-human
trafficking legislation in response to legal change because, facing refugee pressures, they
lack incentive.
Despite socialization and the resulting ease of implementation, the cost of victim
protection will outweigh the costs of noncompliance. I focus on compliance with the
Framework Decision, demonstrating this dynamic with a case study of Germany, a long
term European Union member facing one of the highest rates of refugee arrival, Hungary,
a new member with the highest per capita number of refugees, and Turkey, a candidate
state that is both a source and destination country for refugees.
I find that, indeed, Germany reduced its efforts to comply with anti-trafficking
legislation, particularly in the area of victim protection, in response to the growing
migrant crisis. Hungary has attempted to bolster efforts to combat human trafficking
since joining the European Union, but still faces large deficiencies in capacity. Turkey

has struggled the most implementing policy due to lack of capacity and huge migrant
pressures and showed the lowest levels of compliance.
This research is important because the magnitude of the challenge posed by
human trafficking, and the manner in which this problem is exacerbated by the refugee
crisis. Human trafficking is ranked as the second largest international crime in the world
and the fastest growing criminal industry, profiting more than $32 billion per year (Atak
& Simeon 2014). It affects all states in the world. In 1998, the International Criminal
Court named trafficking in persons a crime against humanity (Atak & Simeon 2014). The
United Nations considers it a top international priority (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime).
Recently, Europe has seen a surge of both refugees and human trafficking.
According to the United Nations Refugee Agency 135,711 people have reached Europe
illegally since the start of 2016, and the majority of them are trafficking victims
(UNHCR). The United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crimes identified 7,300 victims of
human trafficking in Europe in 2006. Because only 1 in 20 victims of human trafficking
are actually identified, the number is likely closer to 140,000 (UNHCR). Human
trafficking is particularly difficult to combat because victims are seen as criminals; they
break the law when they enter the host country illegally (Framework Decision
2002/629/JHA). This research will help scholars define political environments that foster
the best compliance with international human trafficking legislation, enabling more
effective efforts to combat this growing international crime.

The European Union’s Legislative Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
Many states recognize that a multilateral approach is needed to combat human
trafficking. Therefore, intergovernmental organizations have crafted policy that member
states are expected to implement domestically. Legislation tends to address three main
issues: the prosecution of human traffickers; the prevention of future offenses, and the
protection of victims. Prosecution involves the conviction of offenders and sentencing to
significant prison sentences, generally greater than four years (Framework Decision
2002/629/JHA). Prevention efforts include: public awareness campaigns; support for
nongovernmental organizations and partnerships between NGOS, police, and the
government; and reductions in labor law penalties in sectors where trafficking is common
(US Department of State). Victim protection involves rescue, rehabilitation, and
reintegration. Governments must identify victims, prioritize victims’ rights and safety,
and provide victims with avenues to work legally, temporarily reside, or obtain
citizenship in the country (US Department of State). Long-term rehabilitation and
cooperation between police and NGOs are essential (US Department of State).
The European Union’s 2002 Framework Decision on Combatting Trafficking in
Human Beings (2002 Framework Decision) is one of the leading multilateral approaches
to the problem. Legislative implementation of the Framework Decision began in 2002,
with a standard of universal compliance by signing countries set for August 1, 2004. As
stated in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 9 of the Lisbon Treaty,
all members of the European Union are subject to framework decisions. The EU gives
member states autonomy in transposing all aspects of the 2002 Framework Decision. Yet
members are expected to accept the definition of human trafficking in Article 1 of the

Framework Decision. According to this definition, human trafficking involves trafficking
in human beings for the purposes of labor or sexual exploitation. Punishable acts include:
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, exchange or transfer, or control over
people for the purpose of exploitation of the victim’s labor or services (including sexual
services). The use of coercion, force, threat, deceit, fraud, or the abuse of authority must
be a factor. Instigation, aiding, abetting, and attempt to commit these offenses are also
crimes (Article 2). The acts are punishable if the offence deliberately endangers the life
of the victim, the victim is particularly vulnerable, serious violence is employed, or the
offense committed as part of a larger criminal enterprise (Article 3). Member states must
ensure that the offenses are punishable to the proportionate level, with a maximum
penalty of at least 8 years imprisonment (Articles 3, 4,5). Legal persons must also be
punished with appropriate penalties, such as exclusion from public benefits (Article 4).
States must establish jurisdiction over an offense if committed in their territory, the
offender is a national or, in the case of a legal person, established in their territory
(Article 6) (Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA).
The 2002 Framework Decision is relatively straightforward and thorough in
establishing a basis for prosecution. Guidelines for the protection and assistance to
victims are minimal, however. Article 6 also further states that children should be
considered particularly vulnerable victims, adding that when the victim is a minor the
member state should ensure appropriate assistance for his or her family (Framework
Decision 2002/629/JHA). Primarily to address the need for victim protection, and
following an international trend in this direction (UN Office on Drugs and Crime), the
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union passed an amendment to the

Framework Decision in 2011, replacing the Council Framework Decision from 2002.
Highlighting its emphasis, the 2011 Framework Decision is named: “Directive on
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims”
(Directive 2011/36/EU). It calls for new initiatives taking a gender and children’s rights
approach to prevention, with an emphasis on protecting vulnerable persons and
preventing discrimination. In addition, victims should be immune from prosecution for
the use of false documents or punishments for crimes they took part in as part of their
human trafficking experience. The focus should be on protecting their human rights,
avoiding further victimization by accusing them of crimes, and encouraging them to act
as witnesses against their perpetrators (Directive 2011/36/2011). The 2011 Framework
Decision also added new criminal activities categorized as human trafficking,1 increased
penalties for offenders, drew attention to the differences between labor and sex
trafficking, and called for the establishment of national monitoring systems (Directive
2011/36/EU).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets the meaning of framework
decisions in an effort to spur uniform implementation in domestic laws. However, the
ECJ has not laid down specific guidelines or principles for the interpretation of the
Framework Decision (Lebeck 2007). Therefore, states have freedom in drafting their own
legislation, and vary in compliance in terms of clarity of standards and effectiveness of
implementation (Eriksson 2013). At the same time, research indicates that regional and
international organizations have generally held states accountable for failure to comply

1

Additional offenses include: forced begging; exploitation of a person to commit crimes such as pickpocketing, shop-lifting, drug trafficking; and trafficking human beings for the purpose of removal of
organs, illegal adoption, or forced marriage.

(Eriksson 2013). I therefore expect that European Union members have an incentive to
implement the Framework Decisions of 2002 and 2011.

Rethinking Legislative Change in the Midst of a Refugee Crisis
Although European states have incentives to comply with the Framework
Decisions, they also face tremendous pressure stemming from the recent refugee crisis in
the region. Many European states have revised their anti-trafficking legislation to
criminalize trafficking victims (Beale & Sterck 2015), and made it more difficult for
individuals to obtain refugee status (Atak & Simeon 2014). EU states have responded
with higher levels of prosecution, but not prevention and protection (Beale & Sterck,
2015). The human trafficking legislation has become highly security focused, with an
emphasis on preventing terrorism instead of victim protection (Beale & Sterck 2015).
Beale and Sterck’s quantitative work found that European Union immigration legislation
has an abnormally high level words such as “Al-Qaeda”, “attack”, “bomb”, “emergency”,
and “enemy.” The prevailing approach focuses on law enforcement, and limiting
irregular migration (Krieg 2009). As human trafficking increases exponentially during
the refugee crisis, variations in domestic laws cause tension in an already hostile situation
(Hasani 2015). A balanced, all-inclusive immigration policy is required for the European
Union to better monitor and implement legislation in individual states (Orlowska 2011).
A member state’s failure to comply with regional standards for victim protection is an
issue for regional organizations, such as the European Union, and intervention is needed
to induce compliance.

Theoretical Approach to the Impact of European Union Status in the Face of Crisis
Scholars theorize two main explanations for compliance with regional and
international agreements: the rational actor and the socialization or norm-based
approaches (Keith 2010). According to the rational actor approach, states comply with
multilateral agreements only when the benefits exceed the costs (Hathaway 2005).
Examples of costs include damage to the state’s reputation and denial of aid in the global
community; and accountability through domestic political institutions (Keith 2010;
Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009). Followers of this approach generally conclude that
states will ignore their agreements when compliance conflicts with their interests (Waltz
1979). In contrast, adherents of the socialization approach contend that socialization in
international norms drives compliance (Keith 2010). Some of these scholars argue that
states, particularly newer and smaller states, comply because they have been socialized to
believe that the required behavior is linked to legitimacy in the world polity (Wotopika
and Ramirez 2007; Goodman and Jinks 2004). Others maintain that states internalize
norms, and feel the pull from obligation to obedience (Chayes and Chayes 1993). They
may fail to comply because they lack the capacity to do so (Chayes and Chayes 1993;
Cole 2015).
A study of the compliance by European Union states with regional agreements
found support for all three of these approaches (Börzel, Hofmann, Panke, and Sprungk
2010). Global ties, such as membership in an intergovernmental organization like the
European Union, have been shown to improve the likelihood of compliance with human
trafficking agreements, particularly in the less defined areas of prevention and
prosecution (Yoo and Boyle, 2015). Eastern European countries, which face capacity

problems, that are members of the European Union comply better with prosecution
demands (Yoo and Boyle, 2015). Therefore, I expect that socialization will push EU
states toward compliance. At the same time, states will calculate the costs and benefits of
adhering to their commitments. A powerful state that can bear financial sanctions and
possible negative judicial decisions by the European Court of Justice will be more willing
to violate the agreement when the cost of compliance becomes too high (Börzel et al.,
2010). Established states, facing the burdens stemming from the refugee crisis, may find
the costs of noncompliance are not high enough to deter violation.
Drawing on this theoretical foundation, I make the following prediction:
I contend that Membership status- member of the European Union (EU),
nonmember of the European Union, candidate for the European Union- as well as length
of membership in the European Union, influences the level of compliance with the
European Union’s Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings. I base this argument on several grounds. First, all European Union member states
fall under the scope of European Union framework decisions as stated in Article 34 of the
Treaty on the European Union and Article 9 of the Lisbon Treaty. These decisions
require member states to achieve particular results without dictating the means of
achieving that result. For instance, for the Framework Decision on Combating
Trafficking in Human Beings member states “must punish any form of recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harbouring of a person who has been deprived of his/her
fundamental rights.” However, the framework decision leaves the methods in which
member states punish the crime up to the individual member state (Framework Decision
2002/629/JHA, pg. 2).

Second, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) holds jurisdiction to interpret the
meaning of framework decisions in an effort to create a trend of more uniform
implementation in domestic laws. However, the ECJ has not laid down clear guidelines
or principles for the interpretation of framework decisions into domestic law (Lebeck,
2007). For example, the Framework Decision to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings
has no specific interpretation guidelines for member states. This causes high levels of
variance in implementation and compliance with these directives and is especially true in
criminal matters. In order to counter this trend, the ECJ has increasingly promoted
institutional logic over that of constitutional choices of member states. This poses
dangers for the legitimacy of member states because as they interpret framework
decisions into domestic laws the ECJ can easily restrict these choices, even though they
gave them the sovereignty to do so in the first place (Lebeck, 2007).
Socialization, Enforcement, and Capacity approaches all play an important role in
a state’s level of compliance to international law.
1. Socialization consists of specific guidelines to states about how they should
behave in the international system. The socialization approach asserts that
states comply out of the belief that an international system, such as the EU,
should be obeyed, rather than compliance with the law suiting their own selfinterests (Börzel et al., 2010). This is particularly true for the European
Union’s laws because of the supremacy and directness of the EU.
Socialization theorists believe that compliance based on socialization
legitimizes small states in the international arena.

2. Enforcement school of thought assumes that states choose to violate
international law because the cost of compliance is considered too high. There
is a positive relation between the power of a state and its noncompliance
record. Powerful states can bear the financial sanctions and possible judicial
procedure before the European Court of Justice, while weaker states cannot
(Börzel et al., 2010). Therefore, powerful states can be much more resistant to
international law and often fall into this school of thought.
3. Capacity theorists believe noncompliance in involuntary. States may be
willing to comply with international law, but cannot because of lacking or
insufficient state capabilities, ambiguous definitions of norms, and/or
inadequate timetables (Börzel et al., 2010). Noncompliance to treaties must be
looked at as deviant rather than expected behavior (Chayes & Chayes, 1993).
I argue that socialization is the driving factor for members of intergovernmental
organizations as they look to inherit and disseminate norms and values, including
legislation, of that intergovernmental organization. Additionally, I argue that the benefits
that member states receive for sacrificing sovereignty are enough to ensure compliance
with international laws. While on the contrary, costs are not high enough for established
member states to be deterred from noncompliance.
I argue that all three of these compliance theories drive the states, with different
membership statuses, in my case study to comply.
Data and Methodology
Through a qualitative case study of United States State Department Trafficking in
Persons Reports under the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, the 3P

anti-trafficking index (Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2015), as well as domestic German,
Hungarian, and Turkish law, I study the level of compliance with the European Union’s
Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. I also
examine political and economic control variables such GDP per capita, Control of
Corruption, and level of democracy for effects on compliance. Additionally, I examine
refugee and asylum data for the impact of these pressures on compliance.
I argue that all three of these compliance theories drive the states, with different
membership statuses, in my case study to comply. Specifically;

H1: Newer members of the European Union or states seeking membership will
comply - with international human trafficking treaties.

H2: Socialization is the driving factor for new or candidate members of
intergovernmental organizations as they look to inherit and disseminate norms and
values, including legislation, of that intergovernmental organization.

Newer members of the European Union or states seeking membership into the
European Union are more likely to comply with regional and international human
trafficking treaties, because they want to further promote their case for membership. A
higher level of compliance, measured by a Tier 1 ranking by the United States
Department of State, a three or above on the 3P anti-trafficking index, as well as
domestic initiatives, will show a willingness to work with the international community
and help candidate countries appear more progressive in their international political

decisions. Compliance with regional and international treaties will legitimize their
country and advance their position in the European Union. These trends will be seen with
my cases Hungary and Turkey.

H3: When new or candidate states do not comply it is most likely due to a lack of
capacity, in the form of government resources or hindering bureaucracy.

I expect that the cases of Turkey and Hungary, states that have fewer resources
that Germany, will support this hypothesis. For example, Turkey and Hungary may have
a smaller police force, less control over their borders, or a sluggish judicial system.

H4: More powerful states in the international organization will comply less
because they can bear the sanctions associated with noncompliance and no longer need
the incentives offered to comply.

I expect to find support for this hypothesis in my case study of Germany, an
established, more powerful, member state. If Germany fails to comply with European
Union law, it is most likely because leaders have weighed the costs and benefits and
decided the benefits of noncompliance are higher than the costs. To be in this position, a
country must have a high level of bargaining power and/or resources so that the costs,
most likely sanctions, are a non-deterrent for international law compliance.
In sum, I argue that newer members of the European Union or states seeking
membership into the European Union are more likely to comply with regional and

international human trafficking treaties, because they want to further promote their case
for membership. A higher level of compliance will show a willingness to work with the
international community and help candidate countries appear more progressive in their
international political decisions. These new, or candidate, member states are concerned
mainly about increasing their image in the international arena, in this case the European
Union. Compliance with regional and international treaties will legitimize their country
and advance their position in the European Union.

I gathered the data and information from sources such as World Bank, Eurostat,
United States Department of State Reports, United Nations Office on Drugs and other
Crimes reports, and the 3P database published by Cho, Dreher, and Neumeyer (2014). I
looked for trends in member versus non-member states to the European Union.
Specifically, I looked for the specific mechanism by which membership in the European
Union affects the level of compliance.

Dependent Variables
US State Department Reports
The main watchdog of compliance to human trafficking treaties around the world
is the United States Department of State. Through the US State Department Trafficking
in Persons Reports we measure compliance with the 3Ps of human trafficking,
prosecution of offenders, prevention of the crime, and protection of the victims, with my
main focus on protection efforts. I look at shifts in Germany’s, Hungary’s, and Turkey’s
rankings through the scale and anecdotes of the reports before the Framework Decision
of 2002, after the decision was implemented but before the 2011 amendment, and then

after the amendment of 2011. Additionally, I compound these reports with domestic
criminal codes, which allow me to see how the law actually shifted and not just
compliance. I examine how the international legislation has been implemented into
domestic laws as well as how the state actually complies with these laws in practice
through prosecution of offenders, prevention of the crime, and protection of the victims,
with a centralized focus on protection of victims.
The United States Department of State released their first Trafficking in Persons
Report in 2001, before the European Union drafted the 2002 Council Framework
Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, and continues to release reports
annually. It catalogs and ranks countries based on their anti-human trafficking efforts the
previous year. The Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) has four tiers of compliance to
anti-human trafficking efforts. These tiers are, in decreasing order of compliance, Tier 1,
Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List, Tier 3.
Tier 1 includes countries whose governments fully meet the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum standards. This ranking does not mean a country has
no human trafficking problem, rather that the country is actively pursuing efforts to
combat it. Tier 2 includes countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s
minimum standards, but they are making significant progress and efforts to meet the
standards. Tier 2 Watch List includes countries whose governments do not fully meet the
TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant progress and efforts to do so.
This is further defined as;
a) the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very
significant or is increasing;

b) there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe
forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of trafficking crimes,
increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in
severe forms of trafficking by government officials;
c) the determination that a country is making significant efforts to meet the
minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take
additional future steps over the next year. Tier 3 includes countries whose
governments do not fully meet the minimum standards and are not making
significant efforts to do so. (United States Department of State, 2001).
“3P” Anti-Trafficking Policy Index

In addition to the US State Department Reports, I examine Cho, Dreher, and
Neumayer’s (2011) “3P” Anti-Trafficking Policy Index. This index measures compliance
with prosecution, prevention, and protection in human trafficking by country. They
evaluate seven areas, such as: the implementation of campaigns for anti-trafficking
awareness; training government and military officials (including peace keepers);
facilitating information exchange among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train
stations, airports, etc.; adopting national action plans to combat trafficking in persons;
promoting cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international
organizations; facilitating cooperation with other governments. The index ranks countries
on a 1-5 scale, 1 being no compliance and 5 being full compliance. There is also an
aggregate score of 3-15, with 3 being no compliance and 15 being full compliance, when
combining all three areas of prosecution, prevention, and protection.

Independent Variable
Membership Status
Germany is a founding member of the European Union, having founded the
European Coal and Steel Community following World War II in 1950. Hungary acceded
into the European Union in 2004. Turkey has been actively trying to join the EU for
decades, but official negotiations started in 2005. When testing our hypothesis, this
should show how Germany complies less with the Framework Decision compared to
other countries in the European Union because it can bear the costs associated with
noncompliance and no longer need the incentives. I expect to see that Hungary and
Turkey comply at a higher level in the European Union in order to legitimize themselves
in the international arena, and only fail due to capacity limitations.

Control Variables

I control for ratification of the United Nations Trafficking Protocol (2000) and the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005)
as controls; all states studied have ratified these treaties. These variables are ratification
of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as well as ratification of the European
Union’s Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. I recognize
that my cases have signed on to the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, Germany

(2000)2, Hungary (2000)3 as well as Turkey (2000)4. Germany signed the Council of
Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005, Hungary
signed in 2007, and Turkey in 2009. I consider the effects of this status. In addition,
Germany, Hungary, and Turkey have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).5

I examine the economic and political characteristics of Germany, Hungary, and
Turkey, including: control of corruption (The World Bank), Gross Domestic Product per
Capita (The World Bank); level of democracy (Polity IV index); percentage of women in
national politics (Inter-Parliamentary Union); US Aid (United States Government);
refugee inflows (Eurostat); refugee source or recipient country(Eurostat); and number of
asylum applications or residence permits (Eurostat).

Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is
used for private gain through using Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank).
Scores range from a -2.5 to 2.5, a higher score indicates better control of corruption.
Gross Domestic Product is measured through GDP per capita in this analysis. Level of
democracy is measured on a -10 to 10 scale by Polity IV. A higher score signals a higher
level of human rights within a country.

2

Germany signed the Trafficking Protocol in 2000. They ratified the protocol on June 14, 2006.

3

Hungary signed the Trafficking Protocol in 2000. They ratified the protocol on December 22, 2006.
Turkey signed the Trafficking Protocol in 2000. They ratified the protocol on March 25, 2003.

4
5

Germany signed onto CEDAW on June 25, 1980 and ratified on July 9, 1980. Hungary signed on June 6,
1980 and signed December 22, 1980. Turkey joined via accession on December 20, 1985.

Results
Germany
I find the greatest support for H4 in my examination of Germany’s scores on the
Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer’s “3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index” (2015). With regard
to victim protection, Germany’s protection ranking on the index decreased from 5 (full
compliance) to a 3 (moderate compliance) in every year following the implementation of
the amendment to the Framework Decision. Specifically, Germany has had difficulties in
complying with standards regarding the criminalization of victims and repatriation.
Germany’s score on prevention decreased from a 5 in 2014 to a 4 in 2015. In addition,
Germany’s score on prosecution decreased from 5 to 4 between 2011 and 2014. Prison
sentences were rarely given and were disproportionate to the crimes. I suggest that
Germany reduced its efforts in victim protection, prevention of the crime and prosecution
of offenders to reduce domestic costs as it dealt with the increasing number of refugees.
After the 2011 Amendment, states were expected to strengthen domestic policies on
protection and establish national monitoring systems that would track crimes, collect
data, carry out assessments, and regularly report statistics. Germany may have decided it
could bear any costs of noncompliance.
The results obtained from the U.S. Department of State’s Reports provide less
support for my argument. In essence, Germany has been ranked as a Tier 1 country
before and after the Framework Decision and it Amendment. Thus, Germany’s efforts
have been considered as fully complying with the minimum standards set by the United
States government. They have made improvements. However, as I discuss below, the
U.S. State Department finds Germany lacking in the provision of residence options to

victims, and in victim assistance measures, which vary across the German states (United
States Department of State 2013). Germany also fails to comply with requirements for
the punishment of offenders (United States Department of State 2013)
Before the Framework Decision, Germany’s Criminal Code included a loose
definition of human trafficking as an offense involving crimes against personal freedom
including, but not limited to, sexual coercion, rape, kidnapping, and false imprisonment
(United States Department of State 2004). Later, Germany further defined human
trafficking to encompass work exploitation in the forms of slavery, servitude or bonded
labor, and sex work and exploitation; and included recruiting, transporting, or harboring
as fundamentals to the crime of human trafficking (German Criminal Code 2016 §§232,
233, and 233a). In terms of penalties, Germany had much weaker sentences for
convicted offenders than the EU Framework Decision requires. The Trafficking in
Person’s Report in 2004 recommended that Germany increase their penalties. In addition,
Germany had a trafficking in persons team, within its Federal Office for Criminal
Investigation, that published reports annually on domestic trafficking updates. Between
2002-2004 this office conducted 289 trials and 159 convictions, an increase from 148 in
2001. 151 of those 159 convicted served prison sentences (US State Department 2004).
The German government’s assistance to victims at that time heavily criminalized
victims, following the overall global trend. The German government offered a 4 week
“reflection” period that allowed victims to testify against their offenders in exchange for
a more lenient deportation process. The program also offered “temporary toleration,”
allowing victims to gain temporary work permits and receive compensation under the
Victim’s Protection Act for testifying against their offender. Germany granted temporary

toleration status to 104 individuals in 2002 (US State Department 2003). Many victims
were repatriated after their help in the investigation was no longer needed. Additionally,
in 2004, 25 state funded trafficking centers and 12 NGOs concerned with human
trafficking were present (US State Department 2004).
After 2004 Germany continued to be ranked high on the US State Department’s
scale. In 2010, one year before the European Union amended to the Framework Decision
on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Germany was ranked as a Tier 1 country.
The United States Department of State identified that Germany had progressed in
addressing forced labor, one of the two main trafficking forms along with sex trafficking.
However, Germany severely lacked in punishments for prosecuted and convicted
traffickers (US State Department 2010). The German Criminal Code criminalizes sexual
exploitation and forced labor, with these crimes qualifying for prison sentences between
six months and ten years (German Criminal Code 2016 §§232 and 233) (United States
Department of State). Germany handed out very few prison sentences for these crimes.
In 2008, 173 people were prosecuted for sexual exploitation, 138 were convicted, but
only 46 served any prison sentence. Additionally, 25 people were prosecuted for forced
labor crimes, 16 were convicted, but only 1 served a prison sentence (United States
Department of State 2010).
Victim protection was also severely lacking in Germany before the Framework
Decision was amended. Non-governmental organizations and government agencies only
identified an estimated 38% of all victims in 2008, which equaled 676 sexual exploitation
victims and 96 forced labor victims. Germany continued to offer only a 30-day reflection
period, in which victims can decide to aid law enforcement in exchange for a temporary

residence permit. At the same time, Germany reported there were no criminal
punishments of victims (United States Department of State).
In 2013, two years after the amendment to the Framework Decision on
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, when European Union member states were
required to implement the Directive in national laws, Germany was ranked as a Tier 1
country. In the reporting period, Germany experienced successes in both prosecution and
victim protection. Germany, since 2010, worked to improve efforts in national legislation
to ensure residence permits to victims, mirroring EU legislation. However, sentencing for
offenders still lacked. Additionally, in victim protection, the drafting of a new labor
trafficking statute, Section 233 of German Criminal Code, hindered victim identification
and offender prosecution by imposing a high burden of proof of crime (US State
Department 2013) (German Criminal Code 2016 §233).
Germany continued to improve on victim identification. The Federal Family
Ministry funded 39 NGOs counseling centers in 45 cities that worked to identify victims
and provide services such as medical and psychological care, legal assistance, vocational
support, and other services. These services directly aided in applications for residence
permits as well. Resources for male victims continued to lag behind those for women.
Overall, 626 trafficking victims were identified in 2013, a decrease from 672 victims in
2012. These victims were offered a reflection period of 12 weeks, work permits, and
residence permits conditional on cooperation with law enforcement. Long term residence
permits were granted to victims with threats to their personal safety or freedom in their
origin states. NGOs reported that in most cases there were no charges against victims of
trafficking, however some victims faced small fines (US State Department 2013).

In 2013, Germany’s main area of noncompliance concerned the appropriate
prison sentences for convicted offenders; its prison sentences were much too short
compared to international standards (US State Department 2013). The United States State
Department pushed Germany to expand their residence permits for victims to not be
contingent on their participation in trials for offenders. Germany also needed to
standardize their victim assistance measures across the 16 federal states; a national
monitoring system, much like the US State Department, would be the most effective way
to do so (U.S. State Department 2013). Considering these findings together with the
results from the “3P” Anti-Trafficking Policy Index, I conclude that Germany has not
complied to the extent one would expect, given its political and economic conditions.
The findings concerning the control variables lend further support to this
conclusion. Germany is a full democracy, with a rating of 10 on the Polity IV scale.
Research indicates that, after a state passes a threshold of 7 on the scale, human rights
offenses decrease (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Germany’s high score should have
eased compliance with the Framework Decision, as their democratic structure is
conducive to a high level of respect for human rights, including victim protection. In
addition, for the time period of this analysis, Germany’s percentage of women in
parliament was generally at or above average. The world-average is approximately 23
percent, and for Europe it is approximately 24 to 25 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union
2017). In 2003, a year after adoption of the Framework Decision (and implementation
began) 32 percent of the seats in Germany’s lower house were held by women, and 25
percent of seats in the upper house were held by women. In 2012, the year after the
Amendment was adopted, the numbers were 33 percent in the lower house and 28 percent

in the upper house. The percentage of women in parliament is positively associated with
the level of protection of victims (Yoo and Boyle 2015); therefore, one would expect
Germany to be more likely to comply with this aspect of the Framework Decision.
Furthermore, Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is ranked 18th
in the world (The World Bank). Countries with larger economies and resources, such as
Germany, should have a higher capacity to implement policy, such as the Framework
Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, and be more likely to comply with
the standards (See Appendix, Graph 1).
In addition, a government with a greater control of corruption should have greater
implementation of human rights norms, including victim protection. Germany scored a
1.9 in 2000 (pre-FD), 1.7 in 2010 (pre- FD Amendment), and 1.8 in 2015 (post-FD
Amendment). Those scores put them in the 93rd percentile in the world for control of
corruption during all phases of the Framework Decision. One would expect Germany
would have scored higher in all areas of implementation of anti-human trafficking
standards.
While political and economic conditions in Germany should facilitate compliance,
Germany does not face strong disincentives for noncompliance, at least in terms of loss
of U.S. Aid. Aid from the United States is directly linked to compliance with the
standards of the US Trafficking Victim Protection Act (TVPA); thus, states that receive
more aid from the United States will be most willing to match their laws to the TVPA
(Yoo and Boyle 2015). Germany was obligated to $604,980 from the United States
Government in 2015. This is a decrease of 1,430,000 in 2014 (137% decrease). Germany
was obligated to a lower average than all other countries in Europe and Eurasia and much

lower than the world average of $4.41 million per year. Thus, Germany receives such
low amounts of aid from the United States, and $0 from the State Department, that they
would feel very limited pressure to comply with the TVPA and other human trafficking
initiatives.
On the other side of the equation, the pressure stemming from the growing
number of refugee arrivals is high in Germany. Out of all European Union countries, not
only is Germany receiving the most applicants for asylum, they are also accepting the
highest number of applicants.6 Graph 2 (see Appendix) indicates a trend of growth in the
number of asylum applicants that begins slowly in 2012, increasing steadily until a huge
spike in applicants occurs at the end of 2014. By 2015, over half of all asylum
applications approved were granted by Germany (International Monetary Fund 2016).
Germany also agreed to relocate 27,000 additional refugees settled in Greece and Italy in
2015. The primary source countries of refugees fleeing to the European Union in 2015,
and specifically Germany, are Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran (International
Monetary Fund 2016). Several of these countries are also states where terrorism is a
concern. Specifically, the Islamic State (ISIS) has conquered territory in regions of Iraq,
Syria, and Afghanistan. ISIS has proclaimed Syria and Iraq as a caliphate, and recently
the Islamic State shifted its focus heavily into North Africa (Panayiotides 2015). I argue
that the increasing numbers of refugees added to the costs of compliance, and that it is
likely to see greater noncompliance as Germany faces a growing refugee crisis. Germany
is overwhelmingly the most popular destination country for these refugees. National
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The International Monetary Fund determined that in 2015 alone there were 995,000 first-time asylum
applications submitted to the European Union. The number of applicants was more than twice that of 2014.
Germany and Hungary received the most (International Monetary Fund 2016).

security concerns will likely be weighed heavily against the desire to comply with
standards of victim protection.

Hungary
I find low to moderate support for H1 through examination of Hungary’s scores
on the Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer’s “3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index” (2015).
Hungary’s overall scores increased since they joined the European Union in 2004.
Increasing from 8 in 2000 and peaking at 13 in 2007. Additionally, their scores increased
to moderate (aggregate 11-13) on the index each year following the amendment to the
Framework Decision. However, victim protection stayed the same at a score of 3
(moderate compliance). These numbers are equal or lower than Germany’s, however
Hungary’s scores in prosecution are higher than Germany’s in every year. Hungary has
always performed well in compliance to prosecution of offenders, but continues to
struggle in protection of victims, specifically in services provided to victims and
repatriation. The effect grows stronger as overwhelming numbers of refugees settle in
Hungary. I suggest that although Hungary complies at a satisfactory rate, with a higher
government capacity they would comply at a much higher rate in search of legitimization.
Hungary also had some level of domestic human trafficking legislation but it was
less than that of Germany in 2004, as the US State Department had them ranked at Tier 2,
meaning Hungary’s domestic laws and efforts were not up to the United States’ standards
but they were making significant strides to reach those standards. This lines up with
Hungary’s European Union Membership status in 2004, which culminated in many
modernization efforts nationally to uphold global standards.

Hungary’s definition of human trafficking in 2004 included the sale, purchase,
exchange, transfer, or reception of another person. Any person that commits these
offenses or transports, harbors, shelters, or recruits another person for the purposes of
control or exploitation has committed human trafficking (Hungarian Criminal Code).
Hungary, prior to the Framework Decision, criminalized human trafficking with
sufficiently severe penalties. Under the domestic Trafficking in Persons law 18 of 22
offenders brought to trial were convicted in 2003, and 12 of those were sentenced to
prison. Additionally, in 2003 the government established the International Center for
Cooperation in Criminal Affairs to work collaboratively with foreign law enforcement on
transnational crimes like human trafficking better (US State Department 2004).
Additionally, as a member of the Council of Europe prior to their European Union
membership Hungary had international support in matters such as human trafficking.
Assistance to victims is where Hungary faced its largest deficit prior to the 2004
implementation of the EU Framework Decision. Hungary offered small caveats such as
offering temporary resident status to victims willing to testify against their offenders.
However, the trend of victim criminalization continued as many victims were often
deported or prosecuted for other violations of laws during this process.
In 2010, 6 years after Hungary joined the European Union and adopted the
Framework Decision to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Hungary was once again
ranked as a Tier 2 country. Hungary had mixed progress in improving victim protection
in 2010. While Hungary’s prosecutions decreased from previous years, they made some
efforts in protection of victims (US State Department 2010).

Hungary’s criminal code in paragraph 175/b prohibits all forms of human
trafficking, with punishments ranging from one-year imprisonment to life imprisonment.
However, this paragraph includes strict evidentiary requirements. In order to prosecute or
identify a victim there must be physical evidence of a sale or transaction of a person
(Hungarian Criminal Code). In 2010, Hungary had 27 investigations for human
trafficking that resulted in 16 new convictions compounded with 23 in-progress
convictions from previous years. These convictions resulted in 20 convictions and prison
sentences (US State Department 2010).
In terms of victim protection Hungary identified only 94 victims in 2009. There
was one shelter that was funded by the government from May 2010- July 2011. However,
this shelter did not serve any victim over the reporting period and is closed off to nonnationals. The government allocated no additional funding to nongovernmental
organizations. Only 45 of the 94 victims gained any type of assistance, this was a
decrease from earlier years. 27 victims aided law enforcement in prosecutions in
exchange for application for a temporary residence permit of 6 months. They, like other
European countries, were allowed a 30-day reflection period. The US State Department
heavily pushed for an amendment of Hungarian Criminal Code paragraph 175/b in order
to remove the language that requires evidence of buying or selling transaction (US
Department of State 2010).
In 2013, once the amendment to the EU Decision was implemented and integrated
into domestic law, Hungary was still a Tier 2 country, continuing on the same trend since
2008 when they dropped from Tier 1. However, Hungary was making significant efforts
in the field of human trafficking. In July 2013 a new domestic criminal code came into

effect, however this domestic response to the EU Directive 2011/36/EU was not
sufficient in that it lacked awareness and sensitivity towards trafficking victims as well as
a lack of appropriate law enforcement training (US State Department 2013).
Protection efforts have overall increased, but are still limited by budgeting
concerns. As of January 1, 2013 shelters must provide services to victims from both
Hungary and abroad, a huge breakthrough for victim protection in Hungary which up
until that point was closed off to non-nationals. Additionally, on January 31, 2013 the
National Police Headquarters implemented a directive (No. 2/2013), that requires victim
protection officers at each police station. In 2013, 133 trafficking victims were identified
in Hungary, only 3 foreign victims were assisted, an increase from 1 in 2012.
Specifically, Hungary provided legal support for 4 victims, accommodation for 1,
psychological support for 5 victims, financial support for 12 victims, and other forms of
support for 7 victims. Victims were provided with a 30-day reflection period and
temporary residency permit if they assisted with law enforcement. The safety of the
victims remained a concern (US State Department 2013).
As of 2013 Hungary still needed to increase victim assistance through expanding
resources nationally. Shelter capacity is lacking and funding is inconsistent and
repatriated victims are often denied assistance. Additionally, victims that face serious
danger in their source country need to be handled with more care and concern, rather than
immediate repatriation. Most importantly, Hungary needs to ensure that their domestic
laws are harmonized with the EU Directive 2011/36/EU (US State Department 2013).
The findings concerning the control variables are as follows. Hungary has scored
a rating of 10 on the Polity IV scale and as I have said earlier, research supports that as a

state enters a certain level of polity, 7 and up, human rights offenses decrease (Davenport
and Armstrong 2004). Hungary’s high score should allow for higher compliance with the
Framework Decision, as their democratic system is conducive of high levels of respect
for human rights, including victim protection. However, in 2003 Hungary only had 9.8
percent of seats in parliament held by women. In 2012, the year after the Amendment to
the Framework Decision was adopted, Hungary still only had 10 percent of seats held by
women. Compared to the global average of approximately 23 percent and the European
average of 24 percent, this is significantly low (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). This
low percentage of women representation in parliament could hinder protection of victims
in Hungary, as the percentage of women in parliament is positively associated with level
of victim protection (Yoo and Boyle 2015).
In examining H4, I looked at GDP per capita as well as control of corruption. I
find support for my hypothesis that Hungary is only reaching moderate levels of
compliance due to lack of government capacity to fully implement the Framework
Decision. Hungary is ranked 56th in GDP per capita in the world (The World Bank).
Although, Hungary’s ranking is not particularly low on the global scale, they do rank
lower in European GDP per capita (see Appendix Graph 3). As the pressure of refugees
flowing into Hungary increases their low GDP per capita may lower their capacity for
implementing policy, such as the Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in
Human Beings.
Additionally, Hungary’s government has struggled with control of corruption. A
government with lower control of corruption may experience lower implementation of
human rights norms, including victim protection. Hungary scored a .7 in 2000 (pre-FD),

.3 in 2010 (pre-FD Amendment), and .1 in 2015 (post- FD Amendment). These scores
place Hungary in the 61st percentile in the world during all phases of the Framework
Decision. I expect that Hungary would not be able to implement anti-human trafficking
standards as easily as their European counterpart, Germany.
While political and economic conditions in Hungary may hinder compliance,
Hungary has other strong incentives to comply. Hungary receives aid from the United
States annually. Aid from the United States is directly linked to compliance with the
standards of the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA); thus, states that receive
more aid from the United States will be most willing to match their domestic laws to the
TVPA (Yoo and Boyle 2015). Hungary was set to receive $1,000,000 from the United
States Government in 2016. This is a decrease of 60 percent from 2015. Hungary was
obligated to a higher average than the other countries in the region of Europe/Eurasia but
much lower than the world average of $4.41 million per year (US Foreign Aid). Since
Hungary does receive a significant amount of aid compared to other states in their region,
they would feel more pressure to comply with the TVPA and other human trafficking
initiatives.
In addition to facing weaker political and economic conditions, Hungary is
receiving the most refugees per capita in Europe and is the number one destination
country for asylum seekers (International Monetary Fund 2016). Within the past three
years asylum applications have increased by around 800 percent. As seen on Graph 4 in
Appendix applications begin to increase in 2012 and face a substantial spike in 2014. The
primary source countries of refugees entering Hungary are Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Iran (International Monetary Fund 2016). These countries have high instances of

terrorism within the last two decades. Specifically, the Islamic State (ISIS) has conquered
territory in regions of Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan (Panayiotides 2015). Because of the
higher security concerns that are associated with refugees coming out of these countries
and into Europe, national security concerns in Hungary have to be weighed heavily
against the desire to comply in order to gain legitimacy in the international arena. I argue
that if Hungary had a higher capacity to comply to victim protection they would.
Hungary has satisfactory compliance to human trafficking legislation as ranked on the 3P
Anti-Trafficking Index, but faces large economic and bureaucratic hurdles that prevent
further compliance to victim protection efforts. However, Hungary complies better than
Germany in prosecution of offenders and increased their scores from low to moderate
since they joined the European Union in 2004, which shows a desire to be legitimate in
the European community while handling the intense pressures of this crisis.

Turkey
In following suit of my two previous case studies I examine Turkey’s scores in
the 3P “Anti-Trafficking Policy Index” by Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2015). Before
the Framework Decision, Turkey scored significantly lower than Germany and Hungary,
receiving an aggregate score of 5 in 2000. This score indicates a low level of compliance
with anti-human trafficking agreements. However, Turkey saw a sharp increase in
compliance following the implementation of the Framework Decision in 2002, jumping
to an aggregate score of 10. Turkey remained relatively constant with moderate to strong
scores ranging from 10 to 13 before the amendment in 2011. Following the amendment
in 2011, Turkey dropped to a 9 in 2013 and 2014.

Turkey faced the largest deficit of the three countries in 2004 according to the US
State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report. The TIP ranked them as a Tier 2 watch
list country, which meant that Turkey did not fully comply with the minimum standards,
but were making efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards.
Additionally, the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking was very
significant or was significantly increasing in Turkey during the time, or there was a
failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in
persons from the previous year (US State Department 2004).
Still, Turkey included human trafficking in their domestic criminal code prior to
2004. Article 80 of their criminal code prohibits both sexual exploitation and labor forms
of human trafficking. These crimes come with heavy sentences of eight to twelve years
imprisonment. Turkey defined human trafficking as facilitating the unlawful entry of a
foreigner into the country. Human trafficking also included providing shelter for,
kidnapping, transporting a person from one place to another unlawfully or by force,
threat, or violence. The criminal code also included acts of enticement or taking
advantage of helpless persons in order to force them to work or serve while being treated
like a slave (Turkish Criminal Code).
Turkey, while lacking in other factors, particularly criminalized human trafficking
with sentences exceeding 20 years. However, the equal implementation of these penalties
is where Turkey was lacking. In fact, government officials involved in human trafficking
in 2003, did not receive sentences close to that stated in their criminal code. Turkey does
have the presence of an inter-agency police task force based in Istanbul that deals heavily
with human trafficking (US State Department 2004).

Victim assistance is Turkey’s most prominent downfall prior to 2004. Turkey had
the practice of “dumping” victims back in their source countries without proper screening
for many years. This process of “dumping” means repatriating human trafficking victims
to their source countries with no regard for their safety. This practice began to change in
late 2003 and those changes were not yet reflected in the 2004 TIP report. The most
widespread issue in Turkey was the separation between local authorities and the
standards of the central government. This was greatly hindering improvements
nationwide prior to 2004. Larger cooperation with NGOs also began in late 2003, early
2004. A new policy was introduced in 2004 that would provide full medical assistance to
victims and extend the humanitarian visa from 1 month to 6 months for victims (US State
Department 2004).
By 2010, Turkey had increased its standing from Tier 2 Watchlist to Tier 2. This
still means that Turkey is not complying to minimum standards set by the United States
Department of State, but they are actively trying to. Turkey still faced problems with high
levels of repatriation of victims and a severe lack of funding of nongovernmental
organizations working to combat human trafficking within the country (US State
Department 2010).
In terms of prosecution Turkey continued its reputation of aggressive
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of traffickers. Under Article 80 of their penal
code 23 traffickers were convicted in 2009, all of which received prison sentences
ranging from one to twelve years, with the majority receiving six to twelve years. Overall
Turkey convicted 50 people for human trafficking offenses in 2009. Turkey’s judicial

system also trained 164 judges and prosecutors on human trafficking offenses and
protocols (United States Department of State 2010).
Although prosecutions were strong prevention continued to lack in Turkey in
2010. Turkey still continued to struggle in identifying victims, but did continue to train
all military personnel on possible warning signs prior to international development.
Turkey also worked to expand its “157” crisis hotline for human trafficking tips, but there
is no evidence that the funding was ever received from the government. An international
television campaign between Moldova and Turkey had some success (United States
Department of State 2010).
Protection of victims was Turkey’s largest obstacle during the reporting period.
Although the Turkish government did approve plans for a third anti-trafficking center to
be added to their current centers in Istanbul and Ankara, funding for the two current
centers was severely lacking and backlogs in bureaucracy has delayed this third shelter.
Overall 85 trafficking victims were provided assistance at these two shelters during the
reporting period. Most victims denied to cooperate with police for investigations or
simply for evidence due to distrust in the law enforcement system. In response to this an
agreement was signed that allows shelter staff to interview victims and collect
testimonies. A translation services agreement was also signed in the effort to collect more
information from victims and further assist them. A total of 102 victims were identified
in Turkey in 2009, 75 of which were repatriated to their source country. These are large
decreases from previous years. Turkey offers humanitarian visas for up to six months, but
none were applied for during the reporting period (US State Department 2010).

In 2013 Turkey remained a Tier 2 country in the United States Department of
State’s reports. The Government of Turkey restructured its anti-trafficking programs in
response to shifting leadership priorities. This restructuring detrimentally affected
Turkish efforts to fight trafficking. Victim protection dropped by 50% over 2 years and
law enforcement efforts were next to nothing. The Turkish interagency national taskforce
on combating human trafficking has not met since 2012 and denied that children are
trafficking victims in Turkey as well as denied the existence of forced labor in Turkey
(US State Department 2013).
In the reporting period, the Government of Turkey significantly reduced efforts to
protect victims. Turkey only identified 15 female victims in 2013, compared to 51 in
2011, only 3 of those 15 received services. The government reported no children as
victims of trafficking, mirroring the Turkish interagency national taskforce on combating
human trafficking statements. The government provided funding to 3 shelters that
provided psychological and medical care, social activities, counseling on humanitarian
visa and residency permits, and counseling on their rights to return to their origin country.
Foreign and domestic victims are provided the same services, as reported by the Turkish
government. Foreign victims can apply for a 6-month humanitarian visa, that could be
extended to 3 years, were provided a 30-day reflection period, and could obtain a work
permit. However, victim identification lacked because of improper and/or lack of law
enforcement training. Often, law enforcement failed to identify victims and deported
them with no assistance (US State Department 2013).
The government’s anti-trafficking program needs to completely overhauled,
including victim identification, law enforcement efforts, data collection, and interagency

coordination. Victim identification efforts need to be significantly increased, especially
for men and children. Increasing incentives for victims to cooperate in prosecution of
offenders, including an adequate reflection period. Turkey needs to ratify comprehensive
anti-trafficking legislation and use it as a model for national systems, for example the EU
Directive 2011/36/EU (US State Department 2013).
These overwhelmingly critical reports of Turkey’s compliance are further
compounded by examining the control variables. Turkey has faced extreme fluctuations
in their level of democracy as measured by the Polity IV scale. However, since the 1990s
they have consistently received a score of 7 or higher. Since 2012, Turkey has received a
score of 9. As I have identified previously, research indicated that when a state passes the
threshold of 7 on the scale human rights offenses decrease (Davenport and Armstrong
2004). Turkey’s score of 9 should aid in compliance efforts, as their democratic structure
is conducive to a high level of respect for human rights, in this case victim protection of
refugees.
However, contrary to their high democracy scores during the time period of
analysis, Turkey had a low representation of women in parliament. In 2003, one year
after the Framework Decision was passed, Turkey only had 4.4 percent of seats in
parliament held by women. Turkey saw an increase to 9.1 percent in 2010 (pre- FD
Amendment) and 14.2 percent in 2012 (post- FD Amendment) (Inter-Parliamentary
Union 2017). As stated previously the percentage of women in parliament is positively
associated with the level of protection of victims (Yoo and Boyle 2015). With lower
percentages of women in parliament than the global average of 23 percent, and the

European average of 24 to 25 percent, I would expect Turkey to be less likely to comply
with the victim protection aspect of the Framework Decision.
Additionally, Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is ranked 56th in
the world (The World Bank). Turkey’s per capita GDP is relatively low for a European
country and may signal a lower capacity to implement and comply with the policy in the
Framework Decision (see Appendix Graph 5).
Government control of corruption also has an effect on implementation of human
rights norms, including victim protection. Ranking on a scale of -2.5 (low control) to 2.5
(high control), Turkey has consistently fallen on the lower end. Turkey scored a -0.3 in
2000 (pre- FD), 0.0 in 2010 (pre- FD Amendment), and -0.1 in 2015 (post- FD
Amendment). These scores put Turkey in the 50th percentile in the world for control of
corruption (The World Bank). I expect that these scores would hinder Turkey from
implementing policy effectively in comparison to both Hungary and Germany.
Turkey’s political and economic conditions I examined are not desirable for
implementation of policy or compliance. However, there are other factors that may push
Turkey further towards compliance. Aid from the United States acts as a motivator for
compliance as aid is directly linked to the level of compliance within a country to the
Trafficking Victim Protection Act (TVPA). Planned aid for Turkey in 2015 was $3.85
million, this was much higher than the average for Europe and Eurasia and slightly lower
than the global average of $4.41 million (US Foreign Aid). The amount of aid that
Turkey receives from the United States should motivate the government to comply at a
higher level.

However, Turkey is facing extreme pressure in terms of refugees fleeing across
their borders from the conflict in the Middle East. Although there is less reliable data
available since the refugee crisis is relatively new and refugees fleeing across the Turkish
border is much more difficult to track because of the proximity, there are some
overwhelming facts available. Turkey now hosts the highest number of refugees, at 3
million (Amnesty International) (UNHCR). Syria is overwhelmingly the largest source
country for refugees in Turkey, with about 2.75 million of these refugees originating
from Syria. Turkey also hosts about 400,000 non-Syrian asylum seekers, mainly Iraqis
and Afghans (Amnesty International) (UNHCR). With borders getting tighter in Europe,
more and more refugees are using Turkey as a passage into continental Europe. In
response, the European Union passed a deal with Turkey that states that all refugees
caught trying to pass into Europe from Turkey will be returned to Turkey in exchange for
higher aid to Turkey, visa-free travel for Turkish nationals, and revival of negotiations for
Turkey to accede to the EU. As volatile as this deal is, it will prove to be pivotal in
Turkey’s compliance with legislation as they look to legitimize themselves for accession
into the EU.

Discussion and Conclusion
In my analysis I find support for some hypotheses, while I find little support for
others. Specifically, I find moderate support for H1. Since H1 encompasses both Hungary
and Turkey I cannot fully support it. In my analysis of Hungary, I find moderate support
that new member states of the European Union will comply to the Framework Decision
to Combat Trafficking in Persons better than established member states. Hungary’s

aggregate scores on the “3P anti-trafficking” index rose from 8 to 13 during the
implementation of the FD and the United States Department of State praised Hungary’s
efforts in prosecution. However, Hungary still struggled with capacity problems,
specifically in terms of GDP/capita and control of corruption, which hindered their levels
of compliance, specifically in victim protection. Hungary is facing the highest levels of
refugees per capita, which compounded with these capacity problems is greatly hindering
compliance. This shows support for H3.
I find little support for H1 when examining Turkey. Although Turkey’s aggregate
scores on the “3P anti-trafficking” index did increase from a 5 (pre-FD) to a 10 (postFD), they dropped again following the amendment, which follows the trend I predicted
for more established states in H4. Additionally, Turkey was ranked the lowest in my case
study by the United States Department of State as a “Tier 2 Watch List” country. I
expected that since Turkey is actively trying to join the EU their scores would follow the
trend of EU countries more closely, which boast higher scores overall. However, as
expected by H3, Turkey faces large capacity problems that greatly hinder their
performance. Turkey has a low GDP/capita and faces high levels of corruption that
contribute to Turkey’s lack of compliance with the Framework Decision. Additionally,
Turkey is having to deal with the huge amounts of refugee inflows as they have become a
gateway into Europe for many Middle Eastern refugees.
I find evidence to support H2 in both cases of Hungary and Turkey. Most changes
in Hungary’s compliance efforts were seen after they joined the European Union and
wanted to bolster their international status. Turkey is actively in communication with the

European Union to help increase their compliance efforts and in turn reopen talks to join
the EU.
Finally, I find support for H4. I expected that long-term members of the European
Union would reduce compliance in response to the growing number of refugees because
they can bear the sanctions associated with noncompliance and no longer need the
incentives offered to comply. Germany is a very powerful founding member of the
European Union. In weighing the costs and benefits of compliance to the Framework
Decision, Germany may have chosen to bear the costs of noncompliance, such as
reductions in US Aid. Germany has a strong GDP; they clearly do not rely on aid from
the United States. It likely had the capacity to improve victim protection. Although
Germany maintained high levels of compliance according to the U.S. Department of
State’s blunt measure, I see a decrease in its ranking on victim protection on Cho, Dreher,
and Neumayer’s (2015) “3P” Anti-Trafficking Policy Index as the increase in the number
of refugees placed more and more pressure on Germany. Thus, despite socialization,
Germany made a rational decision to reduce its efforts at victim protection and
prosecution of offenders as the costs of compliance became too high.
Through these case studies I added to the understanding of state compliance in
times of international crisis. This research will help scholars define political
environments that foster the best compliance with international human trafficking
legislation, enabling more effective efforts to combat this growing international crime.
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